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We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn
extra information as to how they value the various local public goods
once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mech-
anism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that
efﬁciency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdic-
tions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they
seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the
result are discussed.
I. Introduction
The so called free-ridingproblem(Samuelson1954) is awell-known source
of inefﬁciency attached to the provision of public goods. An informational
version of it can be described as follows. Agents interested in the imple-
mentation of public goods may pretend they are less so in an attempt to
reduce the price they have to pay for it, relying on others’ contributions
to ensure that the public goods are provided. To the extent that citizens
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can freely choose their jurisdictions viewed as competing public good pro-
viders, Tiebout (1956) suggested that the free-riding problem should be
alleviated given that citizens would sort efﬁciently according to their pref-
erences.1 According to the Tiebout hypothesis, the competition between
jurisdictions together with the option of citizens to vote with their feet
would induce efﬁcient outcomes in the context of locally provided public
goods. The Tiebout hypothesis has been highly inﬂuential in a number
of policy debates including schooling issues (Hoxby 2000, 2007; Roth-
stein 2007), residential segregation (Benabou 1993; Bayer and McMillan
2012), and decentralization issues (see Oates [1972], Baicker, Clemens,
and Singhal [2012], or Boadway and Tremblay [2012] for more recent
contributions).2
There have been several attempts to formalize the Tiebout hypothesis
within the general equilibrium (henceforth GE) framework, typically as-
suming there is excess supply of jurisdictions so that in equilibrium juris-
dictions (assumed to be revenue maximizers) make zero proﬁt. When a
singleprice is attached tomembership (or to the consumptionof thepub-
lic good), efﬁciency is not guaranteed as shown in Bewley (1981) because
heterogeneous pricing (of the Lindahl type) would be required when ju-
risdictions are populated by heterogeneous citizens. Assuming that pref-
erences are revealed once citizens have chosen their locations, efﬁciency
is typically implied by the equilibriumnotion considered in thosemodels,
once allowing for heterogeneous preference-dependent access prices.
This is so because in the logic of coalitional deviations, if a more efﬁcient
composition existed, a jurisdiction could propose it and make positive
proﬁt. A remaining issue is whether an equilibrium exists: This is typically
not so in ﬁnite economies and can be shown to be so in continuum econ-
omies (see, e.g., the surveys of Scotchmer [2002] and Wooders [2012]).
Only a few papers in the literature consider the possibility that the prefer-
ence type of citizens remains private information even after the location
decision (e.g., Ellickson et al. 1999; Allouch, Conley, and Wooders 2009;
Konishi 2013), in which case additional constraints prevail on the pricing
and the efﬁciency criterion (equal treatment if there is common access to
the public good or extra incentive constraints if various types get access
to different positions as in Konishi [2013]). A few other papers allow
for moral hazard interactions once located, and then jurisdictions/ﬁrms
are viewed as competing in contracts (Prescott andTownsend 2006; Zame
2007; Scotchmer and Shannon 2010). It should be noted that none of
these papers allow citizens to receive additional information once located.
1 It is not so clear, however, if there are several types of citizens who would join the same
jurisdiction, how the free-riding problem would be completely eliminated.
2 Direct tests of actual migratory responses to public good provision are less common
(see Banzhaf and Walsh [2008] for an example with [local] pollution and references on
the topic).
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To sum up, in the previous GE approaches to the Tiebout hypothesis, ef-
ﬁciency is generally immediately implied by the equilibrium notion, and
the challenging issue is whether an equilibrium exists.3 Importantly, these
approaches also implicitly assume that citizens can freely coordinate on
who joins a given jurisdiction, thereby justifying the kind of coalitional de-
viations needed to support efﬁciency.
We adopt a different approach in this paper. First, we explicitly allow,
in (general) public good contexts, for asymmetric information to be re-
ceived by citizens both before and after the location choice so as to cap-
ture that many opportunities in relation to local public goods become
clearer once located. The post location information typically results in the
heterogeneity of preferences ex post irrespective of the location choices
of citizens, thereby calling for elicitation procedures (which were not con-
sidered in the GE approaches to the Tiebout hypothesis).4 This is mod-
eled through the apparatus of mechanism design. Jurisdictions that may
differ inmanycharacteristics(assumedforsimplicity tobeobservable)post
mechanisms that determine the local public goods and taxes to be paid by
citizens ex post as a function of their reports. On the basis of the proﬁle of
posted mechanisms, citizens sort into the various jurisdictions where we
assume that ex ante identical citizens use the same location strategy.5 A
continuum of citizens and jurisdictions is considered. This implies that
a single choice of mechanism by one jurisdiction does not affect the equi-
librium utilities of the different types of citizens. It also implies that the
number of citizens of a given ex ante type entering a given jurisdiction is
stochastic and is governed by a Poisson distribution.6 Our main extra as-
sumptions are that the private information of a citizen concerns his own
preference only (private value environment), taxes enter in an additive way
(quasi-linear environment), and optimal sizes of jurisdictions are bounded
(congestion assumption). Other than that, our framework is very permis-
sive allowing for general information structure involving multidimen-
sional and correlated private signals. In equilibrium, jurisdictions post
mechanisms that maximize their objective anticipating the effect of the
mechanism on the location choices and the equilibrium choices of citi-
3 This is typically obtained in continuum economies using the techniques summarized
in Dufﬁe and Sun (2007).
4 While in Konishi (2013) there is some heterogeneity in the formed jurisdictions be-
cause agents can be assigned different roles/positions, no heterogeneity arises in Allouch
et al. (2009) in which all citizens are exposed to the same public good. Anyway, because
there is no post location information and citizens can coordinate their participation deci-
sions, mechanism design is absent from these contributions.
5 This symmetry assumption will imply mixing, and it is a key departure from the mod-
eling in GE models in which, as reminded above, it is typically assumed that citizens can
coordinate their participation decisions.
6 Such distributions are familiar in the directed search literature (Rogerson, Shimer,
and Wright 2005). They correspond to the limit of the sum of binomial distributions that
would arise in ﬁnite economies.
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zens’ reports after the location choice, and citizens sort in the various ju-
risdictions and report their ex post preferences in a way that serves their
interests best.
Our main result is that if jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues
(deﬁned as the sumof collected taxesminus the cost of the public goods),
one equilibrium outcome of the above competitive environment is the
ﬁrst-best welfare-maximizing outcome in which (1) public goods are efﬁ-
ciently chosen in each jurisdiction and (2) citizens are efﬁciently distrib-
uted across jurisdictions (from an ex ante perspective). In our efﬁcient
equilibrium, jurisdictions all post the pivot mechanism, that is, the VCG
mechanism,7 in which citizens are charged the welfare loss their presence
causes on others. While the pivotmechanism like other VCGmechanisms
is well known to guarantee ex post efﬁciency, it also ensures that the efﬁ-
cient participation decisions can be sustained as a free mobility equilib-
rium because citizens’ payoffs in such a mechanism correspond exactly to
their contribution to the local welfare. Since jurisdictions’ objectives can
be rewritten as the local welfare net of the opportunity costs of participat-
ing citizens, the decentralization result follows.
Interestingly, if jurisdictions are instructed to maximize local welfare,
inefﬁciencies may necessarily arise. Our result thus gives some support
to the idea that local public goods should be managed privately (we dis-
cuss at the end a number of limitations of this conclusion). It should also
be mentioned that whenever all jurisdictions receive positive participa-
tion in equilibrium (efﬁcient jurisdictions are scarce), those jurisdictions
typically make strictly positive expected proﬁts. Thus, our efﬁciency re-
sult is not driven by a cutting price argument as in the Bertrand model
or the previous GE approaches to the Tiebout hypothesis.8 Our frame-
work also allows us to shed new light on applications typically not consid-
ered in local public good contexts such as two-sidedmarkets and compet-
ing exchange platforms.
Our decentralization result can be viewed as generalizing an insight ap-
pearing in the competing auction literature (the seminal contributionbe-
ing McAfee [1993]) that has highlighted the emergence of second-price
auctions with reserve prices set at the seller’s valuation, insofar as such
a second-price auction corresponds to the pivot environment in single-
object auction environments. It should be mentioned that in our general
environment, it may be optimal to split unevenly ex ante identical citizens
across similar jurisdictions because of economies of scale, which contrasts
7 VCG is an acronym for Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973).
8 Epple and Zelenitz (1981) also obtain that revenue-maximizing jurisdictions may
make positive proﬁts when the market becomes competitive. Since they do not include ju-
risdictions’ rents in their welfare criteria, they interpret this as a source of inefﬁciencies.
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with auction environments. Our decentralization result takes care of un-
even splitting through the introduction of public correlation devices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe
the economic environment. In Section III, we describe the competitive
equilibrium. Our decentralization result appears in Section IV. Exten-
sions and limitations are discussed in Section V.
II. The Economic Environment
A. The Various Agents in the Economy, Their Information,
and Preferences
Jurisdictions.—There is a continuum of jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction j
is characterized by a publicly observed type kj belonging to a ﬁnite set
KJ . The mass of type kj jurisdictions is denoted by fJ(kj).
Citizens.—There is a continuum of citizens coming from ﬁnitely many
groups inKC . Every citizen i belongs to one group ki ∈ KC , where groups
are also referred to by an index k ∈ f1, ::: , Kg and K refers to the cardi-
nality ofKC . Themass of group k citizens is denoted by fC(k). After joining
a jurisdiction, any given citizen i learns his (ex post) type vi ∈ V, which
fully characterizes his preferences over the various possible public goods
in the jurisdiction. The set V together with a j-algebra on V deﬁnes a
measurable space.Without loss of generality, the private signal vi includes
the group to which i belongs, and we let k :V→f1, ::: , Kg denote the
function that maps any citizen’s type into his group. Conditional on
the realization y of a variable Y, the types of the various citizens in a ju-
risdiction with type kj are distributed independently and according to
the measure fkðjy, kjÞ for a citizen of group k. The variables Y (assumed
to belong to ameasurable space) are distributed independently across ju-
risdictions according to some measure fY(). Such a statistical representa-
tion allows us to cover general patterns of correlations between citizens’
valuations.
Consider a given jurisdiction with n citizens and a proﬁle of types de-
noted by v 5 ðv1, ::: , vnÞ ∈ Vn. We let V ≔ [n∈NVn denote the set of all
possible proﬁles v for all possible sizes n of jurisdictions. For any k ∈ KC ,
we let v[k] be the subvector of types in v of the citizens coming from group
k, namely, theproﬁle of vi, i ∈ f1, ::: , ng, such thatkðviÞ 5 k. The lengthof
the vector v[k] is denoted by nk(v). We let nðvÞ ≔ ðn1ðvÞ, ::: , nK ðvÞÞ and
~nðvÞ ≔ oKk51nkðvÞ. For a given proﬁle v and a given citizen i ∈ f1, ::: ,
~nðvÞg, we adopt the convention v2i 5 ðv1, ::: , vi21, vi11, ::: , v~nðvÞÞ. With a
slight abuse of notation, we let v 5 vi [ v2i . We refer to k(v) as the pro-
ﬁle of citizens’ group membership associated with the type proﬁle v, that
is, kðvÞ ≔ ðkðv1Þ, ::: , kðv~nðvÞÞÞ. For N 5 ðn1, ::: , nK Þ ∈ NK and kj ∈ KJ , we
let
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denote the density of v in a jurisdiction with type kj conditional on nðvÞ 5
N .9
Local public goods.—Each jurisdiction provides a local public good z in
exchange for possibly citizen-speciﬁc taxes. LetZn denote the nonempty
and ﬁnite set of feasible public goods in a jurisdiction with n participants,
and let Z ≔ [n∈NZn denote the set of all possible public goods when vary-
ing the size of the jurisdiction.
Citizens’ preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear. That is, citizen i
with type vi enjoying the public good z in exchange for a tax ti ∈ R gets
an overall payoff of vðz, viÞ 2 ti , where v :Z  V→ R is a common mea-
surable function that applies to all.10 Any citizen from group k also has
the option not to enter any jurisdiction, in which case he gets a default
expected utility V k > 0.
Jurisdictions are characterized by a type-dependent cost function
C :Z  KJ →R, where Cðz, kjÞ denotes the cost of providing the public
good z when the jurisdiction is of type kj. We assume that when one more
citizen joins, the jurisdiction always has the option to put this citizen aside
and provide a feasible public good to the remaining citizens. This is for-
malized by assuming that Zn ⊆Zn11 for any n ∈ N; and if z ∈ Zn21, then
the left-aside citizen i gets a gross utility normalized to zero (vðz, viÞ 5 0).11
In other words, the public goods we are considering are excludable local
publicgoods.WeassumethatZ0 5 fz0gwiththenormalizationCðz0, kjÞ 5
0, where z 0 can be interpreted as representing a situation with no public
good.
Local welfare.—The ex post local welfare function depends on the pub-
lic good z, the type of the jurisdiction kj, and the proﬁle of residents’
types. It is formally deﬁned by w :Z  KJ  V→R, where wðz, kj , vÞ ≔
o~nðvÞi51vðz, viÞ 2 Cðz, kjÞ. Let w*ðkj , vÞ ≔ maxz∈Z~nðvÞwðz, kj , vÞ denote the opti-
mal ex post local welfare and
z*ðkj , vÞ ∈ Arg max
z∈Z~n vð Þ
wðz, kj , vÞ
a corresponding optimal public good mapping function. The following
assumption is a congestion hypothesis used to guarantee that it cannot
be optimal to have arbitrarily large jurisdictions.12
9 Whenever nðvÞ ≠ N , we let qðvjN , kjÞ 5 0.
10 This is without loss of generality, since any citizen-speciﬁc dependence can be cap-
tured through the dependence in vi.
11 The assumption that V k > 0 reﬂects the (extra) cost of being put aside once in the
jurisdiction.
12 Participation will be modeled later on, but the intuition as to why assumption 1 im-
plies that too large jurisdictions would run into deﬁcit should be clear given that
w*ðkj , vÞ 2 oKk51nkðvÞ  V k goes to 2∞ when ~nðvÞ goes to 1∞.
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Assumption 1. The function w* :KJ  V→R is uniformly bounded
from above.
B. Some Applications
Example 1: Sharing a natural resource. Citizens are homogeneous, and
each jurisdiction is characterized by kj ∈ R1, where kj corresponds to a
limited resource of total value kj, which is extracted at no cost and then
shared equally among the residents. We have w*ðkj , vÞ 5 kj if ~nðvÞ ≥ 1 and
zero otherwise.
Example 2: Selecting the number of users of a public good. Consider ho-
mogeneous jurisdictions each selecting the number of users of the local
public good among a set of (homogeneous) participants under complete
information. Let C(n) denote the cost to serve n ∈ N users. The value of
the public good for a user is normalized to one, and we assume that C is
convex with Cð1Þ > 1.13 We further assume that the average cost per user
function CðnÞ=n is convex with limn→1∞CðnÞ=n > 1 and is minimized
at the mode n* > 1 with Cðn*Þ=n* < 1. Efﬁciency consists in providing
no public good if n < n*l , providing the public good to all citizens if n
*
l ≤
n < n*u , and providing the public good to only n*u 2 1 citizens if n ≥ n*u ,
where n*l ≔ inffn ∈ Njn > CðnÞg and n*u ≔ inffn ∈ NjCðn 1 1Þ > 1 1
CðnÞg. Citizens who stay apart enjoy a payoff V > 0 (corresponding to
another usage of their time).
Example 3: Competition between exchange platforms. Consider jurisdic-
tions proposing trading platforms designed to exchange multiple units of
a homogeneous good. To simplify consider that agents are either (unit-
demand) buyers characterized by a valuation or (unit-supply) sellers char-
acterized by a production cost. Consider a platform with nB buyers having
valuations v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ vnB and nS sellers having costs c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ cnS ,
and let n* be the largest integer such that vn* ≥ cn* . (We let n* 5 0 if v1 <
c1.) If the platform has no friction, then the efﬁcient allocation consists in
n* transactions: the buyers with the n* highest-valuation buyers purchase
one unit of good from the sellers with the n* lowest costs. The welfare is
thenon*i51ðvi 2 ciÞ. For the congestion hypothesis (assumption 1), we con-
sider that at most n transactions can arise in the platform while each (fea-
sible) transaction is costless. For the optimal assignment, we simply have
to replace n* above by minfn*, ng.
13 Our model can deal with situations in which public goods are differentiated by their
quality and citizens have private information on how much they value the quality, in which
case we allow individual preferences to be determined after the location choice in contrast
with Rosen’s (1974) hedonic price model (see also the discussion on hedonic prices in
Konishi [2013]).
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C. The Mechanism Design Setup
A notable feature of our framework is that citizens may receive extra in-
formation regarding their preferences after joining a jurisdiction. It is
then natural to allow jurisdictions to elicit these preferences via mecha-
nisms typically not considered in the previous literature on the Tiebout
hypothesis. Another distinctive feature of our framework to be detailed
later on is that the realizationof who joins a jurisdiction is stochastic. Com-
pared to the standard mechanism design literature, this calls for deﬁning
richer mechanisms that apply no matter how many citizens join the juris-
diction. To simplify the presentation, we assume that jurisdictions post di-
rect deterministic mechanisms such that each citizen i ﬁnds it optimal in
equilibrium to report his type vi truthfully. This is without loss of general-
ity to the extent that jurisdictions cannot post mechanisms that depend
on the choice of other jurisdictions (as in Peters and Szentes [2012]).14
Formally, a (direct deterministic) mechanism, denoted by ð~z,~tÞ : V→
Z [n∈NRn, has the following form.15 Each citizen i is asked to report a
type v^i ∈ V. On the basis of the proﬁle of reports v^, the public good
~zðv^Þ in Z~nðv^Þ is implemented and citizen i 5 1, ::: , ~nðv^Þ is requested to
pay the tax ~tiðv^Þ. Letting ~tðv^Þ ≔ ð~t1ðv^Þ, ::: ,~t~nðv^Þðv^ÞÞ denote the proﬁle of
taxes in the jurisdiction, the revenue (or budget) of the jurisdiction (with
type kj) iso
~nðv^Þ
i51 tiðv^Þ 2 Cð~zðv^Þ, kjÞ. If citizen i’s true type is vi, his ex post gross
payoff is vð~zðv^, viÞ 2 tiðv^ÞÞ. Under truthful reporting (i.e., v^ 5 v), we let
~uiðm, v2i, viÞ denote the ex post payoff of citizen i. Throughout the anal-
ysis, we impose an anonymity constraint stipulating that citizens from the
same group should enjoy the samepayoff whenever they have the same ex
post preferences (formally the function ~ui does not depend on i, and
in the sequel we drop the subscript from the notation).16 We let M de-
note the set of all feasible direct, deterministic, truthful, and anonymous
mechanisms.
Remark.—We have not speciﬁed so far whether a citizen joining a juris-
diction could unilaterally decide to stay apart after learning his type,
thereby obtaining the (null) payoff that accrues to citizens who are left
aside. Whenever such options are available, a feasible mechanism should
14 The reason why it is without loss of generality follows from arguments similar to the so-
called revelation principle noting that a transformation to a truthful mechanism would not
affect the corresponding equilibrium participation proﬁle to be described next. The ex-
plicit treatment of stochastic public good choices is also omitted here to alleviate the no-
tation. See Jehiel and Lamy (2015a), our working paper version, for elaborations on this.
15 We assume implicitly that mechanisms are measurable (i.e., such that the associated
payoff functions are measurable) so that all the integrals we consider next are well deﬁned.
16 What matters indeed is that citizens’ expected payoff prior to their location should
depend solely on their ex ante group. This anonymity restriction stipulates implicitly that
citizens cannot be labeled prior to the location stage and use symmetric strategies. See
Jehiel and Lamy (2015a) for more details.
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also ensure that some form of participation constraints is satisﬁed, the
strongest version being that ~uðm, v2i , viÞ ≥ 0 for any v ∈ V. Interestingly,
as we note later on, our results hold whether or not such additional con-
straints prevail.
III. Competitive Equilibrium with Free Mobility
In our economy, jurisdictions j ∈ KJ simultaneously post mechanisms
m ∈ M as described above. Then a random device z is simultaneously
and independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] for each
jurisdiction. The realizations of z are publicly observed by all citizens, and
participation decisionsmay depend on these as well as themechanisms.17
The introduction of z—which we think is natural from a descriptive view-
point—is required to ensure that the welfare efﬁcient solution can be de-
centralized as an equilibrium inwhich jurisdictions use pure and symmet-
ric strategies. Upon observing the proﬁle of mechanisms and the proﬁle
of z, citizens of the various groups KC simultaneously decide which juris-
diction to go to. Citizens from the same group are assumed to adopt the
same location strategy, and thus any form of coordination (apart from
that based on z) is ruled out at the location stage. Finally, once in a juris-
diction, citizens report their type (we assume truthfulness in equilibrium
as explained above).
Poisson distributions.—Our large market assumption (we work directly
with a continuum of jurisdictions and citizens) coupled with our ano-
nymity restriction leads us to consider that in any jurisdiction the number
of citizens from a given group should follow a Poisson distribution.18 We
let m 5 ðmkÞk∈KC ∈ RK1 refer to a generic proﬁle of Poisson parameters for
each group k ∈ KC in a given jurisdiction (m will be endogenously deter-
mined in equilibrium). That is, letting PðN jmÞdenote the probability that
nðvÞ 5 N when the proﬁle of entry rate is m, we have19
17 Note that z does not enter the utility functions and can be thought of as a public cor-
relation device similar to the one considered in (public) correlated equilibria in game the-
ory (Aumann 1974) or in sunspot equilibria (Cass and Shell 1983).
18 The Poisson model is popular in the search literature (see Rogerson et al.’s [2005]
survey or more recently Peters [2010]) and also in the voting literature (Myerson 1998).
The directed search literature (see, e.g., Eeckoudt and Kircher 2010; Lester, Visschers,
and Wolthoff 2015) also analyzes different classes of “matching technologies.” While the
Poisson distribution has a clear noncooperative interpretation—it assumes implicitly that
entry decisions are made independently (see Jehiel and Lamy [2015b] for elaborations in
an auction environment)—other matching technologies require centralized interventions
that are typically left unmodeled in that literature.
19 In some applications (e.g., big cities in the role of jurisdictions), one may be con-
cerned by the stochastic nature of the size of jurisdictions resulting from our Poisson spec-
iﬁcation. Yet, if the expected number of citizens from group k is large in a jurisdiction (mk is





so that the relative difference in size of similar jurisdictions gets small.
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At the mechanism design stage, we let g ðjm, kjÞ denote the density of the
vector of types v of the residents in a jurisdiction of type kj ∈ KJ when the
proﬁle of participation rates is m ∈ RK1. By iterated expectation, we have
g ðvjm, kjÞ 5 o
N ∈ NK : nðvÞ 5 N
PðN jmÞ  qðvjN , kjÞ,
where qðvjN , kjÞ has been deﬁned above to denote the density of v in a kj
jurisdiction with group proﬁle N of citizens.
We let uJ ðm, kj , mÞ denote the expected utility of a jurisdiction with
type kj having selected the mechanism m 5 ð~z,~tÞ when the proﬁle of par-
ticipation rate is given by the Poisson distributions m and all residents re-
port their type truthfully. When a jurisdiction of type kj seeks to maxi-
mize revenue, we have






~ti vð Þ 2 Cð~zðvÞ, kjÞ
 
 g ðvjm, kjÞdv:
Similarly, we let ukðm, kj , mÞ denote the expected (ex ante) utility of a cit-
izen from group k in a type kj jurisdiction proposing the direct mecha-
nism m when the distribution of participation is governed by m and all
citizens report truthfully. We have by iterated expectation


















dv  fY ðyÞdy:
(1)
Competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a triple of a mech-
anism proﬁle m* 5 ðm*kj Þkj∈KJ ∈ MKJ , a payoff proﬁle V* 5 ðVkÞk∈KC ∈ RK ,
and a participation schedule proﬁle m* 5 ðm*k Þk∈KC , with m*k :M KJ 
½0, 1→R1, such that





uJ ðm, kj , m*ðm, kj , zÞÞdz ; (2)
2. (utility maximization and free mobility of citizens) for any ðm, kj ,
zÞ ∈ M KJ  ½0, 1 and for all k ∈ KC ,20
20 To alleviate notation, we omit the cases (which could arise with ﬁxed subsidies, e.g.) in
which ukðm, kj , m*ðm, kj , zÞÞ > Vk , which would imply m*k ðm, kj , zÞ 5 1∞ but which will run a
744 journal of political economy
m*k ðm, kj , zÞ >
resp:5ð Þ
0 ⇒ ukðm, kj , m*ðm, kj , zÞÞ 5
resp:≤ð Þ
Vk ; (3)
3. (individual rationality and matching conditions) for any k ∈ KC ,








m*k ðm*kj , kj , zÞ  fJ ðkjÞdz 5
resp:≤ð Þ
fCðkÞ: (4)
Any jurisdiction of type kj chooses its mechanism m*kj before knowing
the realizations of z. Condition 1 requires that m*kj maximizes the corre-
sponding expected utility with respect to the choice of mechanism taking
into account the impact of themechanismon theparticipation rates. Con-
dition 2 formalizes the free mobility condition. It says that group k citi-
zens adjust their participation rate to any possible mechanism so that, if
the participation rate is positive, citizens of group k get their equilibrium
payoff Vk in expectation, and if the participation rate is null, they get a
nonlarger payoff. Observe that when a given jurisdiction contemplates
the impact of a tentative mechanism, it is assumed that the equilibrium
utilities of the various group k citizens are unaffected by the mechanism.
This is justiﬁed by our assumption that each individual jurisdiction is in-
ﬁnitesimal, and it would not be a valid assumption if jurisdictions had
market power. In this sense, our utility-taking assumption captures situa-
tions with perfect competition between jurisdictions.21 Condition 3 en-
sures that in equilibrium all type k citizens are assigned to at most one ju-
risdiction and that all type k citizens are assigned to one jurisdiction if their
expected payoff is strictly larger than the expected payoff they can derive
on their own.
IV. The Main Result
A. Global First-Best
In our quasi-linear environment, Pareto efﬁciency reduces to the maxi-
mization of the expected global welfare deﬁned as the sum of all citizens’
utilities from which the sum of the costs of providing all local public
goods should be deducted. For any given proﬁle of (feasible) public good
functions z :KJ  V→Z and participation rate functions m ∈ RKC½0,1KJ1 ,
let GW ð~z, mÞ denote the associated expected global welfare deﬁned as
21 Such a discussion appears also in the direct search literature (Guerrieri, Shimer, and
Wright 2010; Peters 2010).
deﬁcit for the jurisdiction given assumption 1. Our construction is thus as if such mecha-
nisms do not belong to the set M. We also omit the cases in which the conditions (2) do
not have any solution: if such a case arises out of the equilibrium path, let us consider that
we do not impose any equilibrium constraint on m or, equivalently, that the corresponding
mechanism does not belong to the set M.
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The welfare-maximizing solution, which is referred to as the global ﬁrst-
best, seeks to maximize GW ðz, mÞ subject to the matching constraint that
every citizen whatever his group k can belong to at most one jurisdiction.
Clearly, for any participation proﬁle m, welfaremaximization requires any
jurisdiction of type kj to pick a mechanism that implements the efﬁcient
public good z*ðkj , vÞ for every taste proﬁle v of its constituency. Seeking
for the global ﬁrst-best then boils down to ﬁnding an efﬁcient proﬁle of









m^kðz , kjÞ  fJ ðkjÞdz ≤ fCðkÞ 8 k ∈ KC :
(6)
For a given proﬁle of utilities V 5 ðVkÞk∈KC , a given proﬁle of participa-
tion ratesm 5 ðmkÞk∈KC , a given public good function~z : V→Z, and a given
jurisdiction of type kj ∈ Kj , the net local welfare (i.e., net of the opportu-
nity costs of the participating citizens) is deﬁned as22
NLW ð~z, kj , m; V Þ 5
ð
V
wð~zðvÞ, kj , vÞ  g ðvjm, kjÞdv 2o
K
k51
mk  Vk: (7)
Calling l 5 ðlkÞk∈KC ∈ RK1 the vector of the Lagrange multipliers lk as-
sociated to the matching inequalities, the Lagrangian associated to pro-
gram (6) can be written as




NLW ðz*kj , kj , m^ðz , kjÞ; lk 1 V k
 
k∈KC Þ
 fJ ðkjÞdz 1o
K
k51
fCðkÞ  ðlk 1 V kÞ,
  (8)
where z*kj denotes the function z*ðkj , Þ. The ﬁrst-order conditions with re-
spect to m^k associated to the maximization of L imply that at any opti-
mum ðm^opt, loptÞ, and for any kj ∈ KJ and z ∈ ½0, 1, m^optðkj , zÞ should be-
22 Remember that mk is the expected number of citizens of type k in the corresponding
Poisson distribution.
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long to the set Arg maxm∈RKC1 NLW ðz*kj , kj , m; lopt 1 V Þ, which is included in
the set of m ∈ RKC1 such that, for all k ∈ KC ,






0   if  mk >
resp:5ð Þ
0 (9)







k ðz , kjÞ  fJ ðkjÞdz ≤ fCðkÞ
if loptk 5 0. Clearly, l
opt
k 1 V k can be interpreted as the marginal welfare
gain brought by an extra citizen of type k.
Example 2 (continued). In the user selection example, let us as-
sume that V is small enough so that jurisdictions with an intermedi-
ate value of m can contribute positively to the global welfare: formally,
Argmaxm≥0NLW ðz*, m; V Þ > 0. By contrast, when participation is either too
small or too large in a jurisdiction, the associated net local welfare is neg-
ative. If themass of jurisdictions is large compared to themass of citizens,
the optimum consists then in splitting citizens uniformly on a subset of
the jurisdictions and leaving the other ones empty so that citizens get
strictly more than V .23
B. The Pivot Mechanism
For a given type kj of jurisdiction, the pivot mechanism that we denote by
m
piv
kj 5 ð~zpivkj ,~tpivkj Þ is deﬁned by the efﬁcient allocation rule~zpivkj ðvÞ 5 z*ðkj , vÞ
for each v ∈ V and the requirement that each citizen i pays a transfer






i 5 w*ðkj , v2iÞ 2 ½w*ðkj , vÞ 2 vðz*ðkj , vÞ, viÞ:
A fundamental property of the pivotmechanism is that the payoff of each
citizen is equal to the net welfare contribution he brings to the jurisdic-
tion. That is, for each v ∈ V and kj ∈ KJ , we have
~u m
piv
kj , v2i, vi
 
5 w*ðkj , vÞ 2 w*ðkj , v2iÞ: (10)
The pivot mechanism belongs to the class of Groves mechanism (Groves
1973), and it is thus a weakly dominant strategy for each citizen to report
truthfully his type; formally,
~u m
piv
kj , v2i , vi
 







i v2i [ v^i
 
23 See Jehiel and Lamy (2015a) for details.
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for any v^i ∈ V. If two citizens have the same preferences, then (10) im-
plies that they should enjoy the same payoff, ensuring that our anonymity
condition is satisﬁed. To sum up, mpivkj ∈ M. Furthermore, since we have
assumed that jurisdictions can exclude whomever they wish, any extra cit-
izen can increase only the local welfare. Thus given (10), participation
constraints even at the ex post stage are automatically satisﬁed.24
Example 3 (continued). For a realization of the type of the entrants
such that n* ≤ n, the pivot mechanism is characterized by the n* buyers
with the highest valuations who each buy one unit at price maxfvn*11,
cn*g and by the n* sellers with the lowest costs who each sell one unit at
price minfvn* , cn*11g. The revenueof theplatform is thenn*  ½maxfvn*11,
cn*g 2 minfvn* , cn*11g ≤ 0. The inequality is obtained by noting that n* is
such that vn* ≥ cn* and vn*11 < cn*11.We see that the pivotmechanism runs
somedeﬁcit exceptwhen thecongestionconstraint is binding(n* > n), in
which case the revenue can be expressed as n  ½maxfvn11, cng 2 minfvn,
cn11g—an expression that is typically positive.
C. The Main Decentralization Result
Theorem 1. Assume that the congestion condition (assumption 1)
holds. When jurisdictions are revenue maximizers, there is a competitive
equilibrium in which all jurisdictions post the pivot mechanism and the
global ﬁrst-best is achieved.
The proof of the theorem consists in building an equilibrium based
on the optimal solution ðm^opt, loptÞ of the Lagrangian, where the Lagrange
multiplier loptk ≥ 0 augmented by the reservation utility V k of group k cit-
izens is identiﬁed with the equilibrium utility Vk of group k citizens. To
this end, observe ﬁrst (as a simple accounting insight given eq. [3]) that
in a competitive equilibrium in which the equilibrium utility of a group k
citizen is Vk, the expected revenue of a kj jurisdiction when she posts the
mechanism m ∈ M is equal to the net local welfare:ð1
0




NLW ð~z, kj , m*ðm, kj , zÞ; V*Þdz ,
(11)
where V* 5 ðVkÞk∈KC . Given that the expected net local welfare is maxi-
mized at the global ﬁrst-best (eq. [9]), in order to establish that posting
the pivotmechanism is optimal for jurisdictions, it is enough to show that
if jurisdictions choose the pivot mechanism, they can achieve the payoff
24 Formally, Zn ⊃Zn21 implies that w*ðkj , vÞ ≥ w*ðkj , v2iÞ, which further implies that
~uðmpivkj , v2i , viÞ ≥ 0; namely, the participation constraints are satisﬁed ex post.
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Ð 1
0 NLW ðz*kj , kj , m^optðz , kjÞ; V*Þdz or, equivalently, that it is an equilibrium
for citizens to participate according to the m^opt Poisson distribution when
jurisdictions post the pivotmechanism. The latter condition follows from
the fundamentalpropertyof thepivotmechanismthat thecontributionof
eachcitizen to the localwelfare corresponds tohispayoff (eq. [10]),which
in the Poisson model translates into





kj , kj , m
 
2 Vk: (12)
From equation (9), the optimality conditions imply the freemobility con-
ditions 3 in deﬁnition 1, thereby establishing the theorem.
To understand the optimality of the participation rates in the pivot
mechanism from a more intuitive viewpoint, consider the social planner
whowants tomaximizewelfare, andholdﬁxed the(optimal)participation
rates for all but one jurisdiction j. Thus, the outside options Vk of group k
citizens are ﬁxed. For the participation rates to be optimally set in juris-
diction j, it should be that the marginal change in expected local welfare
from having another group k citizen move to the jurisdiction coincides
with the outside option Vk (assuming there are possibly some group k cit-
izens in jurisdiction j). Connecting this back to the pivot mechanism, the
surplus a citizen is getting fromparticipating is exactly his contribution to
the local welfare, so that citizens’ incentives to move to jurisdiction j look
just like the planner’s, thereby yielding the desired optimality condition.
Several comments about the derivation of theorem 1 are in order. First,
an important feature that was used in the argument is that the ex ante util-
ity is the same for all citizens of the same group, which forbids any form of
asymmetric coordination in the participation strategies used by citizens
of the same group.25 Second, our arguments (in particular, the two key
steps [11] and [12]) hold irrespective of whether there is correlation in
citizens’ preferences (even conditional on the public signals), irrespec-
tive of whether citizens receive additional information about their fellow
citizens, and irrespective of whether citizens have private information ex
ante (the group k to which a citizen belongs need not be commonly ob-
served).26 Third, our result does not guarantee that all competitive equi-
25 Sequential entry would invalidate the conclusion of theorem 1. For general matching
technologies but ruling out the possibility of ex ante asymmetric information, Lester et al.
(2015) show that the pivot mechanism should be augmented by fees/subsidies designed to
internalize the matching externalities. It should be mentioned that such fees may some-
times lead to violations of the participation constraints.
26 The possibility that citizens have ex ante private information makes it nontrivial that
efﬁciency would arise in equilibrium. This should be contrasted with the symmetric infor-
mation scenario, in which case efﬁciency can always be expected to be achieved through
the use of judicious fees (see Levin and Smith [1994] and Lester et al. [2015] for related
discussions in the symmetric information case).
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libria must be ﬁrst-best efﬁcient.27 This potential multiplicity suggests a
role for the federal government in coordinating agents on the efﬁcient
participationequilibrium.Fourth, inour competitive equilibrium, jurisdic-
tionsmaymake positive proﬁt, in contrast withmost of the GE approaches
to the Tiebout hypothesis: Intuitively, this will happen when there is scar-
city in the mass of jurisdictions with favorable production facilities.28
Our decentralization result can be viewed as generalizing the observa-
tion made in the competing auction literature that sellers ﬁnd it optimal
to post second-price auctions with reserve prices set at their valuations,
since such auction formats correspond to pivotmechanisms in the simple
context of one-object auctions (see McAfee 1993; Peters 1997, 2001).29
The insight obtained in the competing auction literature has also been
used in the directed search literature interested in the wage determina-
tion in ﬁrm/worker matching contexts, generally suggesting simple wage-
setting mechanisms that would be payoff equivalent to the second-price
auction.30 To the best of our knowledge, that literature has not considered
the case ofmultiple hires withpotential complementarities betweenwork-
ers. Our result in that application suggests the use of more complex wage-
settingmechanisms inwhich thewageof aworkerwoulddependon the re-
ported characteristics of his fellowworkers (through the pivotmechanism
formula).
It should be stressed that in contrast to the auction setting, our frame-
work requires the use of public random devices z insofar as it need not be
optimal to spread ex ante similar citizens uniformly over similar jurisdic-
tions when there are too many of them and there are economies of scale
associated with the local public goods.31 Interestingly, in the equilibrium
27 More precisely, when all jurisdictions post the pivot mechanism in the context of ex-
ample 2 with a large relative mass of jurisdictions, there would be one participation equi-
librium with too many occupied jurisdictions in which citizens’ equilibrium utilities go
down to V , which is not the optimum as discussed above. Whether by a judicious choice
of size-dependent taxes/subsidies jurisdictions can force the efﬁcient equilibrium is left
for future research.
28 The idea that one could gain by undercutting a tentative positive-proﬁt mechanism
does not apply here because such an undercutting, by affecting the participation rates,
need not be proﬁtable. This is in contrast with most of the previous literature on the
Tiebout hypothesis with the exception of Epple and Zelenitz (1981).
29 See Levin and Smith (1994) and Jehiel and Lamy (2015b) for environments with a
single auction but in which potential participants have participation/opportunity costs
that can be viewed as a reduced form for competitive environments.
30 Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) and Shimer (2005) consider workers making wage
offers to ﬁrms, i.e., a ﬁrst-price auction setup. Kim and Kircher (2015) extend this insight
in environments in which the sellers’/ﬁrms’ reservation values are private information,
where they cannot make reserve price commitment but can use only cheap talk. Lester
et al. (2017) consider environments in which there are participation costs after the match-
ing occurs: we conjecture that the dynamic mechanism they consider is payoff-equivalent
to the generalized version of the pivot mechanism for such dynamic environments, i.e.,
that bidders pay the expected externality they impose by their presence.
31 See the detailed treatment of example 2 in Jehiel and Lamy (2015a).
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constructed in the appendix to prove theorem 1, all type kj jurisdictions
make the same expected proﬁt irrespective of z, which allows us to rein-
terpret the equilibrium of the theorem as one in which there is no public
device z, but jurisdictions post z in addition to themechanismmpivkj . In par-
ticular, when some kj jurisdictions are always empty at the optimum, it im-
plies that the expected revenue of nonempty kj jurisdictions is also zero
in the equilibrium supporting the global ﬁrst-best.32
Contribution to the mechanism design literature.—An interesting by-product
of our analysis is that the equilibrium shown to decentralize theﬁrst-best is
such that local budgets are ex ante balanced (given that jurisdictions have
the option to propose the default mechanism m0 consisting in providing
no public good [i.e., z ∈ Z0] and charging no tax, which obviously guar-
antees null revenues). This observation together with the observations
that public decisions are ex post efﬁcient and citizens’ individual partici-
pation constraints are satisﬁed in the pivotmechanism seems at odds with
the vast literature that has followed the introduction of the VCG mecha-
nism and that has found in the vein of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
that it was impossible to satisfy simultaneously ex post efﬁciency, individ-
ual participation constraints, and budget balancedness in contexts with
ﬁxed sets of participants.33Of course, a key difference is that the set of par-
ticipants is endogenous in our setting, and our congestion assumption 1
(together with our maintained symmetry assumption) forces the equilib-
rium utilities of agents to be ﬁxed independently of the chosen mecha-
nism. As it turns out, considering the exchange platform application in
example 3, if there were no congestion, the pivot mechanism would lead
to budget deﬁcits for any given set of entrants (this is fundamentally why
the inefﬁciency result of Myerson and Satterthwaite holds as shown by
Williams [1999]). But our congestion assumption captured through the
capacity constraint n of platforms changes the picture. As we have noted,
whenever the number of sellers and buyers exceeds the capacity con-
straint n, the pivot mechanism may run budget surpluses. In the opti-
mum, one must reach the point in which the capacity constraints of plat-
forms are sufﬁciently binding, as otherwise concentrating the exchanges
on a smaller number of platforms (by increasing the participation rates in
32 This can be viewed as formalizing an insight discussed in the context of contestable
markets in industrial organization stipulating that the pressure from potential nonpresent
rivals may drive proﬁts down to zero (see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982).
33 Possibility results can sometimes be obtained in multilateral trading environments in
which there is a sufﬁcient imbalance between the number of sellers and buyers and when
the supports of buyers’ and sellers’ valuations are not identical (see Williams [1999] for the
derivation of such insights). We note that the mechanism used to show this is not the pivot
mechanism as deﬁned in subsection IV.B, but rather the VCGmechanism in which the par-
ticipation constraints of the lowest-valuation buyer and lowest-cost seller are binding. Such
a VCG mechanism coincides with the pivot mechanism when agents’ valuation supports
are identical, but not otherwise (as noted at the end of subsection IV.B, the pivot mecha-
nism always runs deﬁcits when there is no congestion).
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those platforms) would be welfare enhancing (it would increase the pos-
sibility and numbers of efﬁcient trades). At such optimal levels of partic-
ipation, the pivot mechanism must run budget surpluses, as implied by
our analysis.
A second observation is that in contrast with the literature on budget-
balancedmechanisms initiated by d’Aspremont andGerard-Varet (1979),
full efﬁciency does not require that the budget be entirely distributed to
citizens, and jurisdictions play the role of residual claimants (see, how-
ever, the discussion of robustness in Sec. V). Had we forced jurisdictions
to distribute the entire budget surplus to the local residents, then some
inefﬁciencies would be inevitable (see Sec. V on other local objectives for
an illustration of this).
A ﬁnal observation is that the mechanism design literature with exoge-
nous participation has had a hard time dealing withmultidimensional in-
formation,34 and it has suggested that if private information is correlated
across agents, a designer can easily extract the full surplus if the exact
shape of the correlation is available to the designer (Crémer andMcLean
1988).Bycontrast,ouranalysis reveals thatwhenthere iscompetitionacross
designers/jurisdictions and when participation is endogenous, then in
our equilibrium the chosen mechanisms do not depend on the informa-
tion structure at all, and they always correspond to the pivot mechanism,
inparticular,havingarobustmechanismdesignﬂavoraddressingWilson’s
(1987) critique.
V. Conclusion: Robustness, Limitations,
and Extensions
Robustness.—In our quasi-linear environment, the decentralization result
continues to hold if the revenues of jurisdictions are split among agents
independently of their location according to some predeﬁned ownership
structure as in GE models. This is so because there are no wealth effects
on citizens’ incentives in our quasi-linear economy. Note also from (11)
that the expected revenue of a jurisdiction coincides with her marginal
contribution to the global welfare. This implies that if jurisdictions can
makepreinvestmentsaffecting theircost structurebefore interaction takes
place, then efﬁciency can be extended to include the determination of
these, thereby broadening the scope of theorem 1.35 Our result also ex-
tends to the case in which the types of jurisdictions are private informa-
tion, as long as the type kj of the jurisdiction does not affect the distribu-
tion of citizens’ types (see Jehiel and Lamy [2014] for formal details in
34 Difﬁculties arise already in the multiproduct monopoly case (Rochet and Choné
1998).
35 A similar observation appears in Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2014) in the context
of single-object auctions.
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the context of single-object auctions). Finally, the decentralization result
extends to the scenario in which some characteristics of citizens are pub-
licly observed and both jurisdictions’ cost function and citizens’ prefer-
ences function are directly affected by the public characteristics of the
nonexcluded citizens.36 If excluded citizens (either their number or ad-
ditional observable characteristic) enter the welfare,37 then the external-
ity they impose by their mere presence is no longer null, which could re-
sult in the violation of participation constraints. Similarly, if, in addition,
the public characteristics of a citizen were to inﬂuence the distribution of
citizens’ types in the jurisdiction, then thepivotmechanismshouldbeaug-
mented by fees that depend on these characteristics in a way that would
allow the citizens to internalize the resulting externalities, and it could
also result in the violation of participation constraints.
Other local objectives.—Various objectives other than revenues can be
considered. One natural idea would be to require that the revenues of
taxes of jurisdictions be entirely distributed to the citizens of the jurisdic-
tion. We note that in this case inefﬁciencies may inevitably arise. For ex-
ample, in the context of the natural resource sharing example (see exam-
ple 1), this would lead jurisdictions, whatever their amount of natural
resources, to impose no tax, so that jurisdictions with a high amount of
natural resources would be too large as compared with the ﬁrst-best inso-
far as citizens would not internalize the negative externality they impose
on their fellow citizens. Another idea would be that jurisdictions seek to
maximize some form of local welfare. It is not straightforward how to de-
ﬁne local welfare given that the constituency is endogenously shaped by
the choice of mechanism. Assuming that jurisdictions seek to maximize
the welfare of those citizens who join in equilibrium, the objective can
be either the total local welfare or the per capita welfare. In either case,
inefﬁciencies are shown to arise in the context of the natural resource ex-
ample (see Jehiel and Lamy 2015a).We conclude that if jurisdictions seek
to maximize objectives other than revenues including some forms of lo-
cal welfare, it is unlikely that they will be incentivized to post the pivot
mechanism and thus that the decentralization result of theorem 1 would
hold.38
36 Such extensions may be valuable for the modeling of school assignment problems. In
Jehiel and Lamy (2015a), we formalize such externalities by including a speciﬁcation of the
observable characteristics in the public good z, and thus the set of feasible public goods
depends on the proﬁle of observable characteristics of nonexcluded citizens.
37 For example, it could be costly to exclude citizens, and the associated cost could de-
pend on the quality of the public good.
38 Hatﬁeld, Kojima, and Kominers (2015) show that any mechanism that gives efﬁcient
incentives in terms of preparticipation private investments should correspond to the pivot
mechanism. Given that entry decisions can be viewed as a preparticipation investment, we
conjecture that any general decentralization result should rely on the pivot mechanism or
some payoff-equivalent mechanism.
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The mobility framework.—Our analysis assumes that all citizens can freely
choose their jurisdictions to start with, and it does not consider scenarios
in which citizens once located could decide to relocate (relocation costs
are implicitly assumed to be too high). As a natural follow-up, one may
adopt a richer perspective in which citizens could be heterogeneous in
their relocation costs. While a full-ﬂedged dynamic analysis of this goes
beyond the scope of this paper, a simple stylized case can be considered.
Suppose that some citizens are freely mobile as in the main model while
others are stuck to their location. If jurisdictions were to post the pivot
mechanism, it would be an equilibrium for mobile citizens to sort into
the various jurisdictions in a welfare-efﬁcient way.39 However, if jurisdic-
tions seek to maximize revenues, then in an attempt to reduce the rents
of the nonmobile citizens (which unlike those of mobile citizens depend
on the choice of mechanism), jurisdictions would choose to distort the
choice of the allocation rule, typically by providing less public good than is
socially desirable.40 A simple ﬁx to restore efﬁciency can be proposed. Sup-
pose jurisdictions are instructed to maximize local revenues augmented
with the welfare of the local nonmobile residents (such an objective may
be the result of the nonmobile residents enjoying all the property rights
of the jurisdiction). It is readily veriﬁed that the local objective then boils
down to the local welfare net of the utilities of the mobile citizens. The
same logic as that developed in the main model would allow us to con-
clude that the ﬁrst-best can be decentralized as an equilibrium in which
jurisdictions post the pivot mechanism.
Multiple public good jurisdictions.—Our model assumes that a single en-
tity determines all locally provided public goods and their pricing. Taking
into account that there are different types of local public goods (school-
ing, transportation, parks, museums), it would seem natural to explore
scenarios in which each public good would be provided by a separate
body. If public goods are managed independently of each other, inefﬁ-
ciencies are to be expected when public goodmanagers seek tomaximize
revenues. The reason for the inefﬁciencies is that there is a free-riding
problem between the managers concerning the determination of the
common constituency. In a competing auction environment (with multi-
ple sellers per jurisdiction), this would tilt sellers’ incentives towardMyer-
son’s (1981) optimal reserve prices. A preliminary analysis of this in the
context of public goods appears in Jehiel and Lamy (2015a) suggesting
that the free riding is affected by the number of public goods, the elastic-
ity as well as the curvature of the local welfare with respect to the participa-
39 Formally, (12) still holds with nonmobile citizens such that welfare-maximizing entry
proﬁles are equilibrium proﬁles.
40 This follows from the observation that inefﬁciencies would typically arise in optimal
mechanisms with exogenous participation as in Myerson (1981).
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tion rate, and how private information is distributed. Clearly this should
be the subject of further work.41
Local versus global public goods.—In our economy, there is no interac-
tion between jurisdictions once citizens are located. We conjecture that
our results could be extended to situations in which private goods are ex-
changed between economic agents across jurisdictions. However, cop-
ing with situations in which citizens could beneﬁt from local public goods
provided elsewhere (spillover effects) or with situations with global pub-
lic goods that would be provided locally (such as carbon emissions) would
require further investigation. In particular it would be interesting to in-
vestigate whether bargaining between jurisdictions could eliminate the
potential inefﬁciencies resulting from the associated externalities (this
would parallel the question addressed by Jehiel [1997] yet allowing for
much more general competitive environments).
Beyond quasi-linearity and private values.—It is well known from Gibbard
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) that outside the quasi-linear environ-
ment, there is little hope to implement efﬁcient social choice rules in the
presence of asymmetric information at least in a robust way (i.e., relying
on dominant strategy). This is the reason why we maintained the quasi-
linearity assumption by contrast with the GE literature on the Tiebout hy-
pothesis. Moving in the direction of interdependent preferences, Jehiel
and Moldovanu’s (2001) impossibility result gives little hope for the ex-
tension of our decentralization result outside the private value setting
even maintaining the quasi-linearity assumption.
Relaxing jurisdictions’ commitment power and citizens’ rationality.—Our
analysis assumes that jurisdictions commit to their mechanisms at an ex
ante stage. Without such a commitment power, jurisdictions would have
an incentive to distort their mechanisms after the location decisions, in-
validating the decentralization result and calling for some form of regula-
tion.42 Our analysis also assumes that citizens’ location decisions aremade
rationally on the basis of the correct inference regarding the link of the
posted mechanism and the location decisions of other citizens. It would
be interesting to relax this assumption, for example, as it would alter the
working of the ﬁscal competition between jurisdictions, as illustrated in
41 An interesting avenue for future research is to analyze how jurisdictions can alleviate
the inefﬁciencies in multiple public good provider environments. An illustration of this
is provided by auction houses (in the role of jurisdictions) that typically try to deter sellers
(in the role of public good providers) from posting reserve prices above their valuation.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Nonnenmacher (1999) discuss what is considered nowadays by
historians as one of the main explanations for the spectacular development of the Port of
New York in the early nineteenth century: drastic institutional changes in the design of auc-
tions for imported goods. Several innovations in the auction law (regarding taxation) in
New York encouraged sellers to lower their reserve price.
42 See Lamy (2013) for the derivation of such a holdup problem in auctions with endog-
enous entry.
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a competing auction environment by Jehiel and Lamy (2015c), who use
the machinery of Jehiel (2005).
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let ðm^opt, loptÞ ∈ RKC½0,1KJ1  RK1 denote a solution of the Lagrangian of the max-
imization program (6). Note that the inequality loptk ≥ 0 stands as an equality
when the corresponding matching condition for group k in (6) stands as an in-
equality. We now build a competitive equilibrium in which each jurisdiction posts
the pivot mechanism (i.e., m*kj 5 m
piv
kj ), where group k citizens’ expected payoff is
equal to the associated Lagrange multiplier at the optimum augmented by their
reservation utility (i.e., V*k 5 loptk 1 V k), where the equilibrium entry rates at the
pivot mechanism match those at the optimum (i.e., m*ðmpivkj , kj , zÞ 5 m^optðz , kjÞ),
and, ﬁnally, for any other mechanisms m ∈ M the entry proﬁle is speciﬁed such
that the equilibrium conditions (3) are satisﬁed (if a solution to the equations [3]
exists; otherwise we set m*ðm, kj , zÞ 5 ð0, ::: , 0Þ for any z ∈ ½0, 1).
When jurisdictions are revenue maximizers, the expected welfare in a jurisdic-
tion corresponds to the sum of all agents’ expected rents, namely,43ð
V
wð~zkj ðvÞ, kj , vÞ  g ðvjm, kjÞdv 5 uJ ðm, kj , mÞ 1o
K
k51
mk  ukðm, kj , mÞ:
Then by integrating with respect to z and for our equilibrium entry rates, we ob-
tain that for any type kj jurisdiction and any mechanism m 5 ð~z,~tÞ ∈ M,ð1
0



























m*k ðm, kj , zÞdz
 
 Vk ,
where the last equality comes from the equilibrium equations (3) (or, alterna-
tively, m*ðm, kj , zÞ 5 ð0, ::: , 0Þ for any z ∈ ½0, 1 if no such solutions exist). To
sum up, we obtain (11), and the revenue of type kj jurisdictions is thus bounded
by Arg maxm∈RK1NLW ðz*kj , kj , m; V*Þ. Furthermore, this bound (which does not de-
pend on z) is attained for the pivot mechanism and for any realization of z since
m* m
piv
kj , kj , z
 
5 m^optðz , kjÞ ∈ Arg max
m∈RK1
NLW z*kj , kj , m; l
opt 1 V
 
43 We do not allow jurisdictions to burn money. If they could, then the local net welfare
will be an upper bound of the seller’s revenue, and it would not change our argument.
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and since V* 5 lopt 1 V . We conclude that jurisdictions ﬁnd it optimal to post
pivot mechanisms.44
What remains to be shown is that the entry rates m^optðz , kjÞ are equilibrium pro-
ﬁles in the pivot mechanism mpivkj . For this we establish (12). For any vector N ∈
NK , let N2k 5 ðn1, ::: , nk21, nk 2 1, nk11, ::: , nK Þ. Similarly we let N1k 5 ðn1, ::: ,
nk21, nk 1 1, nk11, ::: , nK Þ. As a preliminary, note that ∂PðN jmÞ=∂mk 5 P ðN2k jmÞ 2
PðN jmÞ if nk ≥ 1 and ∂P ðN jmÞ=∂mk 5 2P ðN jmÞ if nk 5 0. For any ðk, kjÞ ∈ KC 
KJ , we have














N ∈NK : nk≥1
½P ðN2k jmÞ 2 PðN jmÞ 
ð
V
w*ðkj , vÞ  qðv ∣N , KjÞdv
 
          2 o
N ∈NK : nk50
PðN ∣ mÞ 
ð
V





P ðN ∣ mÞ 
ð
V
w*ðkj , vÞ  qðv ∣N1k , kjÞdv 2
ð
V





















dv  fY ðyÞdy
          2 o
N ∈NK














dv  fY ðyÞdy 2 Vk
   5 o
N ∈NK







½w*ðkj , v [ ~vÞ 2 w*ðkj , vÞ









dv  fY ðyÞdy 2 Vk :
(A1)
From the fundamental property of the pivot mechanism, equation (10), we
have w*ðkj , v [ ~vÞ 2 w*ðkj , vÞ 5 ~uðmpivkj , v, ~vÞ. Given (1), we obtain (12).
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